Madam President, I yield

myself such time as I may consume, up

to the time I have allotted to me.

I was asked by someone yesterday

after a meeting at the White House on

this issue, What did I think about this

sanctions act? And I said: ‘‘Good act,

bad timing.’’ Good act, bad timing.

The extent to which this act that we

are about to vote on, this sanctions

bill, is of value is a little like nuclear

weapons: Their value is in their nonuse;

their value is in their threat of

use.

The administration has made significant

progress over the 6 months we

gave them with the threat of this bill

in place. It has had the best of all

worlds. It has allowed those in Russia

who very desperately want to cut off

this program and this relationship with

Iran the ability to say, ‘‘we must do

this or we will lose much more than we

will gain,’’ without having to put

themselves in a position politically in

their own country in which they appear

to be publicly buckling to the

pressure applied by the United States.

So, although I have no disagreement

with the principle of H.R. 2709, the Iran

Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of

1997, and I have no doubt that it addresses

an urgent concern we cannot

ignore, I have a great deal of doubt

about whether we should be voting for

it now and sending it to the President

now.

Madam President, to state the obvious,

the cold war is over. One of the

great wonders of it is that the world

was spared any use of nuclear weapons

during that cold war, and almost—almost—

any use of chemical or biological

weapons. The proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction and the means

to deliver them, however, could bring

about the very holocaust that we have

managed to avoid over the past 50

years.

So, everyone here is united in one objective:

to stop, inhibit, curtail the

proliferation of weapons or the means

of delivering those weapons. How do we

best do that? Is the best way to do

that, relative to Iran’s missile program,

to impose these sanctions now?

Will this bill, by its passage, finally

turn off the last few drops of water

coming out of that spigot? Or will it

enhance the prospect that the cooperation

with Iran—which began years ago

and has continued in diminishing

amounts up to now—will be increased,

reversing the momentum of the last 6

months?

It seems to me, as rational persons—

and we all are, obviously, on this—we

have to examine that question. For me,

the instinct to punish Russia for what

they did in the past is overtaken by my

fear that the proliferation will increase.

To the extent that I have a disagreement

with my friend from Connecticut

or my friend from Arizona,

two of the brightest people in this

body, it relates to how I come down on

that question.

One or another country may think it

needs these weapons to protect it from

its neighbors or gain the attention of

the great powers. The fact is, however,

that weapons of mass destruction

threaten us all, especially when the

countries that seek them are ruled by

murderous despots or inflamed by ethnic

or ideological causes.

Today, two sets of neighboring countries—

India and Pakistan, and Iran and

Iraq—pose the greatest threat that

weapons of mass destruction might actually

be used. India and Pakistan have

to be restrained from using such weapons

against each other. I was reminded

by someone today, we are talking

about a response time of 3 minutes—3

minutes; a pretty short leash, quite a

hair trigger—when we are talking

about Pakistan and India. The same

would apply to Iraq and Iran, who have

managed over the last decades to kill

hundreds of thousands of each other’s

citizens. So these two sets of neighbors—

India and Pakistan, Iran and

Iraq—it seems to me, are most likely

to get the world in trouble. Iran and

Iraq have to be prevented from obtaining

such weapons and from using them,

not only against each other but also

against the whole Middle East region,

if not the world.

Some foreign entities, notably Russia,

have continued to assist Iran’s ballistic

missile program intended to give

Iran long-range ability to deliver weapons

of mass destruction. This assistance

must stop, and it must stop now.

Since early last year, U.S. officials

from the Clinton administration, including

the President and the Vice

President, have raised the matter with

their Russian counterparts, Yeltsin,

Chernomyrdin, and Kiriyenko. They

have all agreed it is hardly in Russia’s

interests to give Iran the capacity to

fire long-range missiles with weapons

of mass destruction. Special envoys

Frank Wisner and Robert Gallucci have

worked with Russian Space Agency

chief Yuri Koptev to help Russia determine

what it must do to stem this assistance.

Let us get a little background here,

because we all kind of mentioned it.

Here you have a former empire that

has crumbled around the ears of Russian

leaders. They are left with a number

of the old apparatchiks in charge of

huge, bureaucratic entities, departments,

who have, off and on for the last

9 years, been free agents to some degree

or another.

The idea that Yeltsin has his finger

on, and knowledge about, and the ability

to control every one of his disparate

agencies out there is, I think we

would all acknowledge, not nearly,

nearly a reality. So, since early last

year, American officials have been

working very hard, pressuring, cajoling,

and educating the Russian leadership

as to why this is against the Russian

leaders’ own interests and how to

gain control, how to gain control of

their own entities.

There is an irony here. If we said to

our constituents that there is this outfit

in Russia that doesn’t control what

is happening in a department in one of

the six nuclear cities in Russia, or

doesn’t have control over a department

in Moscow, they would say: ‘‘Wait a

minute, isn’t this the same outfit that

ruled with the iron fist, so that they

would be able to not only have a command

economy, but to command everything?’’

But the fact is, the Russian

leaders do not have that ability any

more. And they do not know how to

gain it.

So I start off with the proposition

that this is a very different circumstance

than if we were dealing with

the U.S.S.R. and this program were

going on. If I were to have turned to

even Gorbachev, or any of his predecessors,

and said, ‘‘you are transferring

this technology to Iran,’’ and had them

say, ‘‘we didn’t know that, or were unaware

of the extent of it,’’ having been

here 25 years and dealt with them on

that issue for 15 years, I would have

said unequivocally on this floor, ‘‘that

is flatout a lie; they cannot not know

that.’’

But it is clear that, although much

was known in some quarters, a lot was

not known. So you actually have the

Russian leadership saying, ‘‘How do we

set up export controls? How do we gain

control? You have been doing this. How

do you all do it?’’ —we have not done it

perfectly, by the way, but—‘‘How do

you do it?’’

The fact is that troubling aspects of

the Russian assistance to Iran program

continue to this very day. I know that.

All of us on this floor have gotten a

briefing. We know that. And with each

passing day, Iran comes closer to obtaining

the ability to have long-range

missiles that can rain down chemical

or biological destruction on Israel,

Saudi Arabia, and U.S. Armed Forces

in the region, and, obviously, to understate

it, that is a real problem.

So, what do you do about this? The

executive branch, in my view, has

made real progress, important

progress, that this bill before us, I believe,

will sacrifice. Let me give you a

few examples.

Last year, Russia expelled an Iranian

Embassy employee who was involved in

seeking assistance for Iran’s missile

program. Russia’s Federal Security

Service, the FSB, says that Russia also

deported a member of an Iranian military

delegation.

The FSB adds, in a statement of May

15, that two officials at a Russian research

center were arrested, convicted,

and sentenced to prison for trying to

‘‘enter into an agreement with a foreign

firm to design homing electronic

devices for missiles.’’

They also foiled an effort by Iran’s

SANAM industry group, to get missile

parts from a Russian firm, NPO Trud.

The FSB statement also adds that,

‘‘All the activities of the SANAM

group on the territory of Russia have

been terminated and prohibited.’’

On January 22, Russia issued Order

No. 57 establishing what are called

‘‘catch-all controls’’ over the export of

any material or technology that might

contribute to Iran’s programs to develop

weapons of mass destruction or

long-range missiles.

Last week, Russia promulgated implementing

directives for that order requiring

that each entity involved in

high-tech material or technology exports

set up a review committee to

screen proposals and specifying ‘‘red

flags’’ that would require referral of

proposals to high-level officials for approval.

Those ‘‘red flags’’ are precisely

the sort of criteria that we would want

Russia to use. For example, they name

certain Iranian entities that are automatically

suspect no matter what they

want to buy. That is a take-no-chances

approach that suggests the seriousness

on the part of Russia.

The pace of diplomacy is slow,

Madam President, and so is the pace of

Russian bureaucracy, and so is the

pace of putting together a Russian

Government that can control Russia. I

understand and share the frustration

that my colleagues feel in this regard.

But, as the kids say, let’s get real.

When was the last time we turned Russian

policy completely around, and how

long did it take?

When we didn’t like the Soviet Union

deploying SS–20 intermediate-range

missiles in the European theater, we

had to build and deploy Pershing missiles

in response before they would sign

the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.

The process took 10 years. It took a

similar period of time for the Soviet

Union, later Russia, to admit it was

violating the ABM Treaty in building a

large phased-array radar near

Krasnoyarsk. And there are a lot of

other examples of how long this takes.

My colleagues will say the assistance

continues, that these institutions and

firms are just looking for ways to get

around Order No. 57, and that there are

still bureaucracies that oppose Yeltsin

and Kiriyenko on this issue; and I will

reply, ‘‘Yup, you’re right, that’s exactly

what has happened.’’

What on Earth does anybody expect?

Do my colleagues expect Russian officials

to be grateful when we catch

them doing something stupid and call

them on it? Do they expect the institutes,

that cannot pay for their personnel,

or their factories that pay their

workers in goods to barter on the market,

to be happy when we tell them

that they have to turn down hard currency

from Iran?

Look, we have a satellite industry

that is apoplectic today—an American

satellite industry that is apoplectic

today—because the House took action

and the Senate may take action curtailing

their ability to launch these

satellites into space from other launch

systems around the world. Why? They

are going to lose billions of dollars.

Mark my word, you are going to start

hearing from their employees saying,

‘‘What have you done to my job?’’

Right? We all know that. We shouldn’t

yield to the company or the employee

if it is against the national interest,

but we are going to hear it.

What would happen, do you think, if

all of a sudden we were to say, ‘‘By the

way, stop doing’’ such and such, which

is the only thing that allows you to

make any money at all, to even be

given goods you can barter on the

street to keep your apartment? I don’t

say this by way of justifying anything

Russia is doing, but there is a report

from an organization I have great respect

for, the American Jewish Committee.

The American Jewish Committee

had a report written called ‘‘The

Russian Connection: Russia, Iran, the

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.’’

It is a very good report. I

recommend it to everyone.

They point to an article that was

written in Russia about missile specialists

who worked in Iran during the past

few years. It says that specialists were

recruited by Iranians in collaboration

with the Federal Security Service—

which is now going to be part of stopping

this.

Then the article goes on to say that

the policy of assisting the missile program

began in 1994, when the thenchief

of Yeltsin’s bodyguard service

was involved in export policymaking,

and that it was done—for what? For

hard currency, for money.

Now we have convinced Yeltsin and a

new government in Russia—which is

probably the most pro-American government

that has existed in the last 90

years in Russia, maybe in Russian history—

we have them taking all these

steps to cut this off. OK? So far, so

good.

The American Jewish Committee report

points out that the reason they

did this was for money. Now we go

ahead and we cut off any money that

we are going to send these Russian entities

in existing bilateral arrangements

we have. What do we think Russian

leaders are going to do? Are they

going to say, ‘‘You know, we now lost

the American support that we, the new

Government in Russia, want, and we

don’t want to be selling this missile

technology anyway because it is

against our interest, so at least we

could have told the folks in those departments

that there was something

coming, but the Americans are going

to cut off that money, we’re not going

to get that, but, by the way, still don’t

follow through on this Iranian program?’’

It is lose-lose. They not only lose the

money that encouraged them to enter

into these arrangements in 1994, because

of our efforts to stop it and because

they were not quick enough and

thorough enough in stopping it, they

have now lost any other aid they have.

Again, I am not approaching this

from an ideological point of view. I am

not approaching this from a point of

view of who is right or who is wrong,

whether they did the right thing or the

wrong thing. I am trying to approach

this from a practical point of view:

How do we assure that what was going

on doesn’t continue? How do we stop

proliferation?

This same report published by the

American Jewish Committee makes a

very, very important point in a section

entitled ‘‘American Policy Options.’’

It says:

Then it goes on to say:

Let’s get this straight. Everybody

has kind of figured this out—let’s review

the bidding.

The Russians were bad guys. They

sold technologies to people who were

even worse guys. The combination of

that is against the interests of the

United States, and particularly against

the interests of Israel. We have to turn

it around and stop it.

We went ahead, and after the last

couple years—with great pressure during

this year, thanks to congressional

leadership having the sanctions sitting

out on the table—convinced Yeltsin,

and now the friendliest government

that ever existed in Russian history toward

the United States, the two new

young guys in positions of power, not

only that it is against their interests,

but also that they better stop. And

there is some evidence they are stopping

it.

They are finding where at least some

of the technology leaks are and they

are turning them off. And now here we

are after they had begun the process

saying, ‘‘Aha, but you did do it.’’ Of

course they did it. And what we’re

going to do is to say, ‘‘we’re going to

cut your water off from this end of the

spigot. We’re going to cut it off.’’

And if the objective is America’s interest

and indirectly Israel’s interest,

which is an American interest, how

does that make sense? Let me add one

other dimension here.

I said: ‘‘This is a good act, bad timing.’’

Let us review the bidding and

what is going on in the Asian subcontinent

right now. Regarding India and

Pakistan, we are breaking our neck,

some of us on this floor personally, the

President, Democrats, Republicans,

pleading, cajoling, doing everything we

can with Pakistan not to up the ante.

We are doing everything we can to take

an Indian Government that has overstepped

its bounds against its good

judgment, in my view, and say, ‘‘Tone

down what you’re doing.’’ We are trying

to put a lid on this.

So what are we doing? Some of us, as

well as the administration, are doing

everything from picking up the phone

and calling Sharif in Pakistan, to saying,

through the administration, to

Yeltsin, ‘‘You, Yeltsin, have a relationship

with India. Call them. Tell them.

Cooperate with us.’’

Every Republican and Democrat who

has any contact in China is trying to

get China to put pressure on Pakistan.

And in the middle of this gigantic effort,

that is literally worldwide, at a

moment when every nation in the

world, particularly the nuclear powers,

fully understands the potential consequence

of Pakistan’s nuclear testing

now and India’s heated rhetoric—now,

when all this is going on—what are we

doing?

In fairness to the leader, this was

under a unanimous consent agreement,

and put off from back in November, but

what are we doing? We are coming

along invoking a sanction potentially

that is going to make it more difficult

by anybody’s standard to get worldwide

cooperation.

Who are the nations that can most

influence Pakistan or most influence

India right now, beyond the United

States? I will bet that if we ask all the

staff in the back who are experts on

this—whether they are for these sanctions

or against them—I bet that if we

asked everybody in this Chamber, and I

put a list on the board saying, ‘‘Which

are the most likely countries to be able

to influence Pakistan,’’ and put Russia,

France, Germany, England and China—

I bet you would all pass the test and

say, ‘‘China.’’ And why would you say

that? Because China has been selling

them missile technology.

Now, I wonder who would have the

most influence on India. The answer is

Russia, for similar reasons. So thus it

seems to me, Madam President, that

this is a good idea at a very bad moment.

We also have a new government in

Russia. We have two young people—and

every analyst to whom I have spoken,

conservative or liberal, Democrat or

Republican, or who has testified before

the committee or spoken to my staff

has said, ‘‘These two new guys are

keepers. They’re the best shot we

have.’’ They are the best shot we have.

Now they have gone out and put their

new, fragile reputations on the line in

that new government, and said, with

regard to assistance to Iran’s missile

program, ‘‘Shut it down.’’ And the first

bit of reward we are going to give them

is sanctions against entities in their

country.

Now, look, some former President,

whom I will not name, once said, ‘‘Life

is not fair.’’ I am not suggesting to

anybody that it would not be fair to

impose these sanctions. By any measure,

it is fair, because they did not play

by the rules. They broke the agreements.

So it is fair; but is it smart? Is

it in our interests? Is it a good idea? In

my humble opinion, the answer is no,

it is not smart, it is not a good idea, it

is not in our interest. The sanctions we

mandate will be resented and they will

be resisted and, in my sincere view,

they will fail where diplomacy is succeeding.

Some aspects of this bill seem calculated

to anger Russia rather than to

secure compliance. One is the ‘‘credible

evidence’’ standard for sanctions. According

to the report on this bill, the

standard is meant to require sanctions

when information is merely ‘‘sufficiently

believable as to raise a serious

question as to whether a foreign

person may have transferred or attempted

to transfer’’ sanctionable

items of technology.

This is kind of the ‘‘shoot first, ask

questions later’’ approach to international

relations. This is cold-war

posturing in a warmer environment,

with the friendliest government we

have ever had an opportunity to work

with, and it will likely fail.

Fortunately, our action today is not

the end of the process. The President is

very likely—very likely—to veto this

bill. And if we have the amendment of

the Senator from Michigan accepted,

which I expect it to be, we will have to

go back to conference.

And I say to you, Madam President,

and to my colleagues, that I hope Russian

officials and firms that follow this

debate will hear the message my colleagues

are sending. If Russian assistance

to the Iranian missile program

does not cease within a matter of

weeks, I truly believe that this body

will override the President’s veto and

set in stone this counterproductive

sanctions bill.

I also say to my friends who believe

that this sanctions bill is warranted on

the merits, if you just do it based on

weighing the scales, that you are giving

up nothing by delaying here. Can

anyone show me that there has not

been real progress over the last 6

months?

So if in 2 weeks or 6 weeks or 8 weeks

this progress has not continued, this

sanctions bill can be brought back up.

But to pass it now, I honestly believe,

will be counterproductive.

Russia’s legal and administrative actions

so far, while insufficient, show

their good intent. There is also a

strong foundation on which to build.

But the edifice of enforcement must be

built quickly. Only speedy Russian action

is likely to avert the sanctions regime

mandated in this bill.

In closing, let me note my deep objection

to the other body’s insistence

upon attaching the Chemical Weapons

Convention Implementation Act to this

measure. This is a practice that has to

stop. It is irresponsible, absolutely irresponsible,

in my view. Combining the

two bills, the Chemical Weapons Convention

Implementation Act and the

Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions

Act, both of which should be sent over

here— I am not suggesting that they

shouldn’t do that—to tie them together

in the hope that it will force the President

to sign the bill is holding hostages

that relate to our national interest as

Americans.

They did the same thing with the

IMF. They did the same thing with the

United Nations arrearages by attaching

abortion language. Each of these

issues warrants debate, but not tied to

one another. Attaching the Chemical

Weapons Convention Implementation

Act to this bill serves merely to delay

for many months and to put at risk a

bill that is important to our national

interests. That was an irresponsible action,

in my view, that ill-befits a coequal

branch of government,